VERIFICATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF CONTROL PROGRAMS BY PETRI NETS WITHOUT STATE EXPLOSION ¹⁾

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Abstract: The development of provably error-free and efficient concurrent manufacturing systems is still a challenge of practical system engineering. Modelling and analysis of concurrent systems by means of Petri nets is one of the well-known approaches using formal methods. Among those Petri net analysis techniques suitable for strong verification purposes there is an increasing amount of promising methods avoiding the construction of the complete interleaving state space, and by this way the well-known state explosion problem. This paper demonstrates that available methods and tools are actually applicable successfully to at least medium-sized manufacturing systems. For that purpose, step-wise validation of various system properties (consistency, safety, progress) and optimization of the concurrent controller software of a discrete event system is performed. If possible, different analysis techniques are applied and compared with each other concerning their efforts.

keywords: programmable logic controller, hierarchical place/transition nets, verification, optimization, temporal logics, model checking, interval nets;

1 Introduction

Petri nets enjoy several advantages with respect to modelling and analysis of discrete event systems with inherent concurrency. Worth mentioning is especially the ability of combining different methods on a common representation. This variety ranges from informal (animation) via semi-formal (systematic testing) up to formal (exhaustive analysis) methods and comprises qualitative as well as quantitative evaluation techniques. But maybe most valuable is the fact that among the formal methods suitable for strong verification purposes there is an increasing amount of promising methods avoiding the construction of the complete interleaving state space, and by this way the well-known state explosion problem.

This paper gives an overview on these alternative methods and reports our experience concerning their strength and limitations for verification and optimization purposes by a running example.

The discussion covers

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- static analysis techniques, constructing no state space at all,
- compression techniques, representing the transition relation by its characteristic function,
- **lazy state space construction**, building reduced (interleaving) state spaces, which are generally much smaller than the complete state space for highly concurrent systems,
- alternative state space construction, exploiting concurrency to build partial order (true concurrency) descriptions of the system behaviour.

Beyond the more sophisticated (but scalable) running example, it is claimed that the optimistic analyses results are typical for a certain class of practical problems. This assumption is justified by case studies performed at our institute (see e.g. [10], short version in [11]), in which Petri net specifications of controller software of realistically sized production cells were developed. Step-wise validation processes were done in two stages: First, context checking (*general analysis*) of general semantic properties (mainly freedom of deadlocks, liveness and boundedness) was managed. Second, verification of well-defined special semantic properties, progress as well as safety properties, given by a separate requirement specification, was performed (*special analysis*). As widely accepted, temporal logics are a suitable tool to express such properties. For the evaluation of temporal logic formulae, the model checking approach is preferable to proof techniques in the case of finite state systems.

In this paper, we deal mainly with qualitative analysis techniques suitable for place/transition nets without time constraints. Quantitative analyses are considered only to prove the unreachability of explicit error states. More detailed quantitative evaluations of our case studies, e. g. by different types of time-dependent Petri nets to prove the meeting of given deadlines in the framework of worst-case evaluation, and by stochastic nets to estimate throughput or average processing time, are in preparation.

The running example is an adopted version of the pusher problem for which in [18] a control program has been synthesized automatically. By this way, this paper presents a reversal check for that synthesis. General transformation rules are sketched to transform programmable logic controller (plc) programs into ordinary place/transition Petri nets. Therefore, the rich amount of available Petri net analysis techniques and tools can be applied for computer-aided analysis of programmable logic controller programs.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quick review on Petri net related analysis techniques which were used in our case studies. In section 3 and section 4, the running example and its informal requirement specification is introduced. Afterwards, the chosen way of modelling with hierarchical Petri nets is demonstrated in section 5. The validation of qualitative properties is described in more detail in section 6, while the necessity of handling quantitative properties in case of explicit error states is highlighted in section 7. Both analysis steps may take advantage of an optimization step. Related results are summarized in section 8. Finally, some conclusions are summarized in section 9.

2 Techniques and Tools

Concerning methods for the analysis of Petri nets, *animation*, *static* techniques, and *dynamic* techniques can be distinguished.

Net-based **animation** aims at functional behaviour simulation by playing the token game. The results gained depend on the abstraction level of the underlying net model. But in any case, this special version of prototyping is only a confidence-building approach unable to replace exhaustive analysis methods.

All **static analysis** techniques have in common that they avoid the enumeration of the state space of a system. The integrated net analyser INA [21] provides an almost complete collection of static analysis techniques of the "classical" Petri net theory [20].

Basic techniques corresponding mainly to general analysis (of boundedness or liveness) are reduction (local reduction rules to minimize the net structure) and structural analysis (structural properties allowing conclusions on behavioural properties, e.g. deadlock trap property). In opposite to that, linear-algebraic analysis revealing invariants supports general analysis (if the net is covered with semipositive place/transition invariants) as well as special analysis. In the latter case, program invariants are proven by showing the existence of related net invariants. So first, suitable program invariants have to be hypothesized, and second, the related net invariants have to be found from the (in general non-minimal) basis of invariants provided by a net analysis tool. Generally, this is hardly manageable for larger systems (larger concerning the size of states). Recently, new approaches appeared to combine invariant analysis techniques with an analysis of traps and model checking algorithms as well [13], [15].

If a desired system property can not be determined by structural analysis techniques, **dynamic analyses** may be applied. The classical approach is the exhaustive construction and exploration of the (interleaving) state space (reachability graph). INA provides the determination of general net properties like the freedom of deadlocks, boundedness, and liveness based on reachability analysis. More sophisticated analysis tasks can be formulated in the query language of the reachability graph analysis tool PROD [25]. Computational Tree Logic (CTL)¹) is completely expressible in this language.

Although almost every behavioural property of a Petri net with finite reachability graph can be theoretically decided by exhaustive analysis, this approach is limited in practice due to the state explosion problem.

Compression techniques alleviate the state explosion by avoiding an explicit representation of the (interleaving) state space of a concurrent system. Ordered binary (or natural) decision diagrams (OBDDs, ONDDs) [2], [13] represent sets of states (and sets of transitions between states) by their characteristic function. Model checking (in this context sometimes called *symbolic model checking*) of temporal logic formulae can be performed on OBDDs (ONDDs) without an explicit enumeration of the state space state by state. Symbolic model checking was not considered yet in the validation of our case study examples, but is in preparation based on the ideas outlined in [26]. For an experience report of this approach see in the meantime e.g. [3].

For some analysis questions, it is only necessary to construct a **reduced version** of the interleaving state space of a system instead of the complete one. If we deal with system properties which are invariant under the interchanging of concurrent transition occurrences, it is unnec-

¹⁾ For an introduction to temporal logics and the notation used in this paper see [5].

essary to consider all those interleavings. In this way, dead states for instance can be found or the un-/reachability of special states can be decided by considering an usually small subset of all possible interleaving paths. Methods based on this idea are sometimes called **partial order methods** (a term which should be sharply distinguished from partial order representation techniques described below). An example of a partial order method is Valmari's *stubborn set* method [23]. The stubborn set method can be combined with other techniques like the *sleep set method* [9], and the *symmetry method* [24]. Valmari developed a generalization of his method in a way that properties expressible by Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) without the nexttime operator **X** are preserved by the reduction process. Therefore, the standard model checking technique for LTL can be applied to stubborn reduced reachability graphs. Besides its model checking facilities for CTL, PROD provides a LTL model checker based on this approach. The basic stubborn set method for deadlock detection is also implemented in INA.

An alternative class of approaches to handle the state explosion problem bases on **partial order representations** of the behaviour of a concurrent system. Instead of sequences of events (i. e. occurrences of transitions), partially ordered sets of events are used as behaviour description. Partial orders of events can be interpreted in the following way: If an event precedes another one then the former one causes the latter, or the former one has to occur earlier in time than the latter. Since state explosion is in general caused by the representation of all possible interleavings of concurrent actions, partial order representations tend to be much smaller than reachability graphs.

A currently intensively discussed partial order representation approach is the construction of a "finite complete prefix of a branching process" of a Petri net (shortly called the *prefix* of the net) [6], [14]. The possible behaviour of the net is represented by another, so-called occurrence net. The PEP tool [1], [7] provides, besides many other things, an efficient model checking algorithm based on this net prefix for a very restricted subset of CTL comprising only the temporal operators **AG** and **EF**. This model checker is restricted to safe (1-bounded) Petri nets.

Which tools *should* be applied in which order depends on the analysis methods they are based on. Which tools *may* be applied at all for a given type of question depends on their power to express a specific analysis question. To highlight differences between the applied tools concerning their expressiveness, it is useful to summarize typical questions/properties dealt with during analysis. In the following φ stands shortly for a general logical expression characterizing usually a (wanted or unwanted) state or set of states.

- (1) **reachability-related** properties of the logical form **EF** φ : Reachability of a state where φ holds; there exists at least one computation path (future behaviour) to reach eventually a state where φ will be true.
- (2) **safety-related**, **AG** $(\neg \phi)$ or equivalent $\neg EF \phi$: Unreachability of a state where ϕ holds; for every computation path, ϕ will never be true.
- (3) **invariant-related**, AG ϕ or equivalent $\neg EF(\neg \phi)$: General validity of an assertion ϕ ; for every computation path, ϕ will be true for ever.
- (4) **liveness-related**, AG EF φ : What ever happens, there exists the chance (at least one path) that φ will be true.

(5) **progress-related**, **AG AF** ϕ : For every computation path, ϕ will eventually be true.

Table 1 describes which tool may be applied for which type of logical expression.

Tool	Supported type of logic	Operators	Types of properties
INA	-	EF ϕ (but ϕ can only be given by a (sub-) marking)	(1), (2)
PEP	(restricted) CTL	AG, EF	(1) - (4)
PROD	LTL (without next- time operator)	G, F, U (unquantorized versions of AG, AF, AU)	(2), (3), (5)
PROD	(full) CTL	EX/AX, EF/AF, EG/AG, EU/AU	(1) - (5)


Table 1: Temporal operators provided by the different tools.

The tool kit used up to now comprises PED (hierarchical Petri net editor) [16], INA (structural properties, place/transition invariants, stubborn set reduced deadlock and reachability analysis, net reductions) [21], PROD (stubborn set reduced deadlock analysis and model checking - LTL\X) [25], and PEP (prefix-based model checking - CTL₀, linear-algebraic analysis) [1]. More details can be found in the related tool manuals.

3 Task Description

To make the paper self-contained, the running example, adopted from [18], is shortly sketched.

The example consists basically of two concurrently working pushers moving work pieces (see figure 1). The work piece is moved from position one to position two by the first pusher, and from position two to position three by the second pusher. Both pushers are driven by electric motors which can be controlled by corresponding relays into two moving directions.



Starting from this basic situation, chains of concurrent pushers may be constructed in order to move pieces step by step from the input position via a number of inner positions to the output position.

4 Requirement Specification

In addition to the task description given above, a list of informally specified safety and progress properties is provided. Typical properties of this type are:

(a) safety

- At any time, a pusher can be driven in one direction only.
- To avoid collisions, it is not allowed to move adjacent pushers at the same time.
- No pusher motion must be driven too far/near.
- While moving a pusher, a new work piece must not arrive in its input position.

(b) progress


- After an active phase of a pusher, its successor will be activated before the predecessor will be started again.
- It is guaranteed that each pusher works infinitely often (livelock freedom).
- Any work piece entering the plant will finally leave the plant.

(c) consistency

• Additional properties to be verified emerge during modelling reflecting useful (self-) consistency checks (see section 5.1).

5 Modelling with Hierarchical Petri Nets


The model of the total system may be characterized by a strong separation of controller software and environment into different parts. The controller program consists generally of a finite and static set of communicating processes. The environment model is composed of small reusable components: the producer/consumer processes of the work flow, and the devices of the controlled plant.



The composite model is structured into three layers. The top layer of a transport system with two pushers (Figure 2) consists of six macro components. Each macro transition P1 and P2 contains the plant environment model given in Figure 3, but prefixed with the instance names P1 or P2, respectively (see section 5.1). Each macro transition con1 and con2 contains the controller software model sketched in Figure 4, but prefixed with the instance names C1 or C2, respectively (see section 5.2).

5.1 Environment Model

There exists a net component for each device type - building step-by-step a growing reusable




component library to describe the uncontrolled plant behaviour. Each physical device is basically characterized by its finite set of discrete states (maybe representing equivalence classes of possibly infinite sets of states), and additionally by the commands (externally visible transitions - the grey ones) forcing the device to change its current state (see fig. 3). Obviously, each device must be in one and only one state at any time. In terms of Petri net theory, the states of a device form a place invariant. In our example, there are two types of devices (relays, pushers). Accordingly, there are two consistency conditions. E.g. it holds for all pushers *Pi*:

(P1) $(Pi_too_near + Pi_basic + Pi_norm + Pi_ext + Pi_too_far) = 1$

or expressed as temporal formula (\dot{v} stands for exclusive or):

(P1*) **AG** (*Pi_too_near*
$$\lor$$
 Pi_basic \lor *Pi_norm* \lor *Pi_ext* \lor *Pi_too_far*)


For a more systematic analysis procedure (see section 6 and section 7), two versions of pushers are considered: without and with explicit error states (*too_near*, *too_far*). In the initial state (marking), all relays are off, the pushers are in their basic positions, and the plant is empty (contains no work piece).



5.2 Control Program Model

The pattern of the essential parts of the controller macro transitions (con1, con2) is given in Figure 4. The original programmable logic controller programs are written in IEC 1131-3 [4] (see left part). These programs are (automatically¹) translated into ordinary place/transition nets. For an example, how this could look like, consider the right side in Figure 4.

In order to avoid unnecessary restrictions of the concurrency degree, it could be helpful to exploit a special test arc feature for modelling of the transitions' side conditions (in our running example: Ri_on , Ri_off . In that case, the amount of data, which has to be searched through during the analysis steps, may become much smaller, provided the analysis tools are prepared to handle test arcs (compare discussion in section 6.1).



1) The automatization of this translation is part of the running project.

5.3 Requirement Specification in Model Terms

Finally, the informally given requirement specifications have to be transformed into the terms of the formal model.

(a) safety

• At any time, a pusher can be driven in one direction only:

(P2) **AG** $(\neg(Pi_R1_on \land Pi_R2_on))$, $\forall i$

• To avoid collisions, it is not allowed to move adjacent pushers at the same time:

(P3)
$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{2} P_{j}R_{i}on + \sum_{i=1}^{2} P_{k}R_{i}on\right) \le 1$$
, $\forall i, \forall j, k : j+1 = k$

- No pusher motion must be driven too far/near:
 - (P4) **AG** $(\neg Pi_too_near)$, $\forall i$
 - (P5) **AG** $(\neg Pi_too_far)$, $\forall i$
- While moving a pusher, a new work piece must not arrive in its input position:

(P6) **AG** $(posi_full \rightarrow Pi_basic)$, $\forall i$

(b) progress

• After an active phase of a pusher, its successor will be activated before the predecessor will be started again:

(P7) **AG**
$$(Pi_norm \lor Pi_ext \rightarrow \mathbf{AF} (\neg (Pi_norm \lor Pi_ext) \mathbf{AU} (Pj_norm \lor Pj_ext)))$$

, $\forall i, j : i + 1 = j$

• It is guaranteed that each pusher works infinitely often (livelock freedom), e.g. (*en*(*t*) stands for the conjunction of all preplaces of *t*):

(P8) **AG** (**AF**
$$(en(Pi_basic2norm)))$$
, $\forall i$

• Any work piece entering the plant will finally leave the plant (which may be considered as a consequence of (P7) and (P8)), i.e. in case of a two-pushers chain:

(P9) **AG**
$$(pos1_full \rightarrow AF pos3_full)$$

6 Qualitative Analysis

We present a two-step analysis. At first, the pusher model without explicit error states is discussed in this section. Afterwards, the error states are integrated leading to the notion of time (see section 7).

6.1 General Analysis

General analysis deals with properties which should be valid independently of the intended functional behaviour of the system. Basically, these are boundedness and liveness.

boundedness: The net is covered by semi-positive place invariants (INA). Moreover, the token sum of all these place invariants equals to 1. So we are able to conclude the 1-boundedness of the net (a necessary precondition for PEP's model checker).

liveness: The deadlock freedom can be proven very efficiently by construction of stubborn reduced reachability graphs (INA, PROD), which are generally much smaller than the complete state space.

Additionally, it can be shown efficiently that the net is covered by semi-positive transition invariants as necessary (but not sufficient) condition for liveness. But liveness (no dead system parts) can't be proven by classical Petri net theory for longer pusher chains, due to the lack of suitable net structures (the given nets are not Extended Simple, therefore the deadlock trap property could not help, the known local net reduction rules do not work), and due to the state explosion by considering all interleaving transition sequences (reachability graph).

The way-out could be a liveness proof for each transition by model checking the temporal formula: **AG EF** (en(t)) based on the branching process' prefix. However (compare Table 2), the prefixes are also unconstructable for more than 6 pushers. The reason for that seems to be the dynamic conflicts caused by the right-hand transitions in the macros of Figure 4, bottom - *Ri_remains_on*, *Ri_remains_off*). After having switched on/off the corresponding relay, they are reproducing the current state until the control program goes ahead (because the pusher has reached the position the controller is waiting for). Due to the lack of test arcs to model side conditions, these reproductions are done in an active way resulting into "useless" dynamic conflicts.

These dangerous transitions are part of general net components for context-independent modelling of basic statements (here to switch the relay on/off). Obviously, such a statement is actually executed in finite time independently of the current situation, i.e. whether the relay is already on/off. The same should hold for an appropriate model of that basic statement. Therefore we need generally these transitions under discussion within the corresponding macro transitions to model adequately both situations. But in case of the given Petri net, modelling a programmable logic control program, these basic statements appear (only) as side conditions of the control flow, and never within the control flow. That's why these transitions are superfluous in the given case, and we are able to optimize our model by deleting them.

We get a first version of an optimized model with the same state space as the unoptimized one (compare the third columns of Table 2 and Table 3), but without far less dynamic conflicts. For this version, the liveness for each transition of the considered pusher chains has been proven by model checking the corresponding temporal formula based on the branching process' prefix.

6.2 Special Analysis

(a) safety

There are different analysis techniques available to prove the unreachability of unsafe states (P2) - (P6):

Facts (INA): The unsafe states may be modelled as facts (special transitions which are expected to become never enabled). But, the evaluation of bad states (a state where a fact is enabled) by the given tool kit requires the reachability graph. That's why we will avoid this approach.

Stubborn set reduction (INA): The net is transformed in such a way that the unsafe states become dead states. Then the stubborn set reduced reachability graph has to be constructed. Because any dead states are preserved under this reduction, the original net does not contain any unsafe states if the transformed net does not reach any dead states. This technique could be useful if the required net transformation is done by the analysis tool.

Place invariants (INA): A sufficient condition for the unreachability of a given marking m is fulfilled if the there exists at least one place invariant x for which the token conservation equation

$$\sum_{p \in P} x(p) \cdot m_0(p) = \sum_{p \in P} x(p) \cdot m(p)$$

is not valid. To check this equation, complete markings must be specified. But unsafe states are usually given in terms of submarkings (containing "don't care" places). This main disadvantage is overcome in the next approach.

Trap equation (PEP): Based on a linear upper approximation of the state space, a sufficient condition for linear properties of the type $A \cdot m \leq b$ has been introduced in [15]. The implementation is integrated in the latest version of PEP. We use it to prove (P3).

Model checking of temporal formulae: Model checking, combined with stubborn set reduction (PROD, LTL\X) or based on the finite complete prefix of a branching process (PEP, CTL₀), provides generally the most convenient method to raise safety questions, esp. because set of (unsafe) states may be characterized in a concise manner. Both model checkers run very fast. Due to the evaluation method, they are applicable also to larger systems of which the size of the interleaving state space is unknown.

(b) progress

(P7) - (P9) use a richer set of (temporal) logical operators. Therefore, model checking facilities are unavoidable. Due to the **AF** and **AU** operators, these properties can be proven only by PROD. We use it to prove (P7) - (P9) for any pusher chain.

(c) consistency

For any pusher chain, (P1) is analyzable by INA, and in the version of (P1*) by PROD or PEP. But for larger systems, it is generally a cumbersome task to prove this type of properties by finding the suitable place invariants.

A summary on the analysis efforts necessary to gain the results mentioned above are given in

the tables 2 and 3.

# pushers	P/T	R	R _{stub}	prefix (B / E)	time(prefix) ^{a)}
1	24 / 25	88	22	128 / 61	0:0.02
2	42 / 46	464	42	293 / 139	0:0.08
3	60 / 67	3.088	79	510 / 242	0:0.40
4	78 / 88	18.848	133	779 / 370	0:3.08
5	96 / 109	118.624	204	1100 / 523	0:43.14
6	114 / 130	738.368	292	1473 / 701	11:38.86
7	132 / 151	4.614.208	397	b)	
8	150 / 172	?	519		
9	168 / 193	?	658		
10	186 / 214	?	814		

 Table 2: Overview on analysis efforts of the unoptimized model.

a) SUN SPARC 20, 32 Mbyte main memory

b) memory overflow after about 50 min having allocated 120 Mbyte main memory.

Table 3: Overview on analysis efforts of the optimized model.

# pushers	P/T	R	R _{stub}	prefix (B / E)	time(prefix)
1	24 / 21	88	22	96 / 45	0:0.02
2	42 / 38	464	42	213 / 99	0:0.05
3	60 / 55	3.088	79	366 / 170	0:0.15
4	78 / 72	18.848	133	555 / 258	0:0.36
5	96 / 89	118.624	204	780 / 363	0:0.63
6	114 / 106	738.368	292	1041 / 485	0:1.19
7	132 / 123	4.614.208	397	1338 / 624	0:1.97
8	150 / 140	?	519	1671 / 780	0:3.54
9	168 / 157	?	658	2040 / 953	0:5.26
10	186 / 174	?	814	2445 / 1143	0:6.93

7 Quantitative Analysis


In case of explicit error states within the model (Pi_too_far , Pi_too_near), it has to be proven that a pusher, after having reached the expected extension, is switched off fast enough. Obviously, we have now to take into consideration also the timing behaviour of the given system.

In terms of interval Petri nets [12], [17] (usually called time Petri nets) this means that the error transitions modelling the pusher motions into unsafe states (*Pi_ext2far*, *Pi_basic2near*) may be enabled, but will never fire due to the influence of time. Therefore, the proof of the unreachability of explicit error states ((P4), (P5)) can be traced back to the proof that the related error transitions are dead at the initial state.

This may e.g. happen because the transitions Ci_tr2 and $Pi_R1_set_off$ (disabling $Pi_ext2far$) fire always before $Pi_ext2far$ is willingly to fire (compare figure 5) showing the essential part of the condensed reachability graph). Generally, a proof like that depends essentially on the chosen interval times (but can be done by INA, at least as long as the reachability graph fits into memory). But in this concrete case, we are able to conclude - by evaluating a suitable part of the reachability graph (or at best a non-interleaving version of it) - that for any time intervals for which the relations

 $lft(Ci_tr2) < eft(Pi_ext2far) \land lft(Ri_set_off) < eft(Pi_ext2far)$

hold, the dangerous transitions *Pi_ext2far* will never fire. Similar relations hold for *Pi_basic2near*.



8 Optimization

By help of provably correct optimization assumptions, the amount of side conditions at the transitions in the synthesized controller program may be minimized, e.g.:

• Because *ext* always implies *PosOUT_full*:

(P10) **AG** $(ext \rightarrow PosOUT_full)$

at transition tr2 the side condition PosOUT_full could be deleted.

- Because step2 always implies R2_off:
 - (P11) **AG** (*step* $2 \rightarrow R2_off$)

at transition tr3 the side condition R2_off could be deleted.

Of course, code optimization must not destroy any requirement property just proven. Therefore, regression verification has to be done in the background as the final validation step.

9 Conclusions

At least for the analysis of a restricted class of concurrent systems modelled by Petri nets, the construction of the complete state space can be avoided by a suitable combination of different methods (possibly implemented by different tools). This class can be characterized as follows:

- (Intentionally) life and 1-bounded systems (hence, covered by semipositive place and transition invariants),
- a certain degree of concurrency (which increases the efficiency of partial order methods and partial order representation methods),
- moderate amount of dynamic conflicts.

So, all qualitative (i.e. timeless) properties and optimization assumptions have been proven without construction of the reachability graph (interleaving state space). Up to now, the quantitative (i.e. time-dependent) analysis of interval nets is based on reachability graph construction and evaluation. But in [19], a method has been proposed to describe the behaviour of interval nets by a finite prefix of branching processes. It seems to be worth thinking over how to combine both approaches. Nevertheless, all proves were carried out automatically by help of general Petri net analysis tools. Therefore, they are reproducible in an objective way.

For a general framework for Petri net based development and analysis, we conclude the following design criteria. At first, dedicated technical languages are needed to express functional, safety, and performance requirements as well. Second, the framework has to be customizable. Its components (editors, analysis tools, simulation tools, code generation facility) should be interchangeable. For a given configuration, user guidelines are required showing which analysis techniques are recommendable in which order for a given analysis question. Additionally, design criteria are required which promotes meaningful analyses at each phase of development.

For specific application areas, dedicated configurations of the framework can be defined involving also an adaptation of the libraries and the terminology of the user interface. For instance, in manufacturing control in general, it seems to be possible to compile Petri net libraries of

- patterns which describe the communication structure of certain devices on a cooperation level (for the production cell of our case study [11], three such patterns are identifiable, each of them applicable to at least two devices),
- patterns which are suitable to describe elementary motion steps of the devices, and
- the associated environment models.

Using these libraries, control programs for the supported types of manufacturing systems can be developed by composition and refinement of instantiated net patterns.

In particular, in case of programmable logic controllers, the user interface may be adapted to the notions of the IEC 1131-3 standard [4].

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